An Efficient Way to Link Statements of Fact to Termination Provisions

In recent consulting projects I’ve found myself revising client contracts that address issues as both statements of fact and grounds for termination, as in this made-up example:

Widgetco states that the Widgets are in good working condition.

Acme may terminate this agreement if the Widgets are not in good working condition.

My book The Structure of M&A Contracts (here) discusses how to make statements of fact and obligations in an M&A contract flow efficiently through the rest of the contract. Inspired by that, I’ve found myself experimenting with the following sort of provision as an alternative to saying the same things twice in commercial contracts:

If one or more of the following occurs, Alpha may by notice to Baker terminate this agreement , with termination occurring ten days after Baker receives that notice:

a statement of fact made by Baker in this agreement could not be made again on any date after the date of this agreement without being materially inaccurate[, except that if Baker is capable of remedying the circumstances causing a statement of fact to be materially inaccurate, then Alpha shall not terminate this agreement in accordance with this clause X unless Alpha notifies Baker of those circumstances and Baker fails to remedy those circumstances no later than 10 days after Apha so notifies Baker]; …

What do you think?

When Litigating Confusing Contract Language, It’s Best to Have a Frame of Reference (Featuring “Stepped Rates” and “Shifting Flat Rates”)

During my blogging-in-my-bathrobe years, I entertained myself by trawling on Westlaw for court opinions dealing with confusing contract language. Good times.

In a fit of nostalgia, this evening I went back to Westlaw and entered a search, saying to myself, Yes, I can still do this! But I’d obviously lost my touch, because I forgot to limit my search to recent cases, so the first case I looked at was Tennessee Excavating Co. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., No. 01-A–019201CH00010, 1992 WL 113426 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 29, 1992) (PDF here). It was a serendipitous mistake, because it offered the first-ever example I’ve encountered of a dispute over whether a fee schedule involved stepped rates or shifting flat rates.

“Whether a fee schedule involved what?” I hear you say. If you’re not familiar with those terms, it’s because I invented them, having never seen any discussion of the related ambiguity. (To name something is to bring it into existence.) I haven’t done a blog post about the distinction between stepped rates and shifting flat rates. It’s discussed in the fourth edition of MSCD, at 14.64–.70. Paragraph 14.66 will give you a taste:

But this schedule is ambiguous. If the annual gross revenue is $3.4 million, it’s not clear from this schedule whether the 8% rate is applied to all gross revenue (this manual refers to such a rate as a “shifting flat rate”) or only revenue over $3 million, with the lower rates being applied to the increments of revenue under $3 million (this manual refers to such a combined rate as a “stepped rate”).

It’s good to be able to point to an instance of every kind of ambiguity I write about, so I’m pleased that I encountered this opinion. But that’s not why I’m writing about it.

Instead, I noticed that, unsurprisingly, the Tennessee Court of Appeals didn’t mention stepped rates and shifting flat rates in holding that the contract was unambiguous. Instead, it blundered through an analysis that didn’t make sense to me.

One thing MSCD stands for is that if you try to make sense out of contract language that is, or might be, ambiguous and you have no experience with the subject, don’t be surprised if you fall flat on your face. By contrast, anyone familiar with MSCD who is presented with the dispute underlying Tennessee Excavating Co. would understand what’s involved by flipping to the relevant part of chapter 16. And MSCD would provide a frame of reference for explicating the dispute to others, whether in an opinion or a brief.

That’s why judges and litigators who handle contract disputes would benefit from becoming acquainted with MSCD. The foreword to the fourth edition by Vice Chancellor J. Travis Laster of the Delaware Court of Chancery (here) might help spread the word. And so might appellate guy Jason Steed’s recent review of the fourth edition (here).

And obviously, contract drafters too would benefit from being able to distinguish between stepped rates and shifting flat rates.